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THE OBJECTIVE THEORY OF AGENCY:
APPARENT AUTHORITY AND THE ESTOPPEL OF
APPARENT OWNERSHIP
Michael Conant*
The purpose of this study is to reconsider the theoretical foundations of the liability of a principal to third parties in contract.' In
order to reconcile the extended liability of the principal for unpermitted contracts of his agent beyond traditional apparent authority,
the treatise writers have created new generalized concepts. In Eng-2
land Professor Powell has suggested the phrase "usual authority".
In the United States, Professor Seavey and the Restatement of the3
Law of Agency have adopted the label of "inherent agency powers".
Professor Means goes even further and suggests the adoption of a
scope of agency concept analogous to the tort rule of scope of employment to replace the present authority generalizations.4 The
conclusion of this study is that new conceptual generalizations to
advance the theoretical framework of the law of principal's liability
in contract are not only unnecessary but misleading. The basis of
this conclusion is that these new concepts with more general and
indeterminate content than the older ones seem to be created to
rationalize the imposition of contract liability with little or no
recognition of the primary rule that both contract and estoppel to
deny contract in agency are based on manifestations of consent by
the principal. A valid operational or functional analysis of the
principal's liability in contract in each case can be made by utilizing
the traditional concepts of authority and estoppel. The structural
elements of such a functional theory of agency contracts are suggested in the following review of leading English and American
decisions. 5
*
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"We have too little theory in the law rather than too much...." 0. W.

HOLMES, The Path of the Law, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF AGENCY 41-53 (2d ed. 1961).
3

198 (1920).

W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 15-17, 105-109 (1964);

1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §8A (1957).
4 Mearns, Vicarious Liability For Agency Contracts, 48 VA. L.
(1962).
5 See F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 69-80 (1960).
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THE OBJECTIVE THEORY OF AGENCY
OBJECTIVE THEORY OF AGENCY
The liability of a principal for contracts negotiated by his agent
is the foremost legal issue of agency because the making of contracts
is the primary purpose of most principal-agent relationships. Hence,
it is not surprising that a theoretical framework to approach the
principal's liability in contract is derived from the underlying theory
of contract liability, the objective theory of contract-that liability
is founded on the objective consent of the parties. A person is
bound by his promissory expression in contract if that promise
should create in the promisee the reasonable expectation that promisor will perform on the basis stated. Presuming the other contractual requisites; consideration, legal object, etc.; contractual liability
is not determined by subjective intent but by concurrence of objective expressions if the expressions are such that a reasonable man
should rely on them under the circumstances. 6
The objective theory of agency, as an extension of the objective
theory of contract, is based on expressions or actions which demonstrate the consent of the principal. Just as ordinary liability in
contract is based on voluntary promises, a principal's liability in
contract is based on his voluntary representatons to third parties
concerning the scope of his agent's authority. The representations
may be made by the principal to third parties through the agent's
permitted expressions or acts (actual authority), or directly to the
third parties (apparent authority). These representations are
analogous to the offeror's promise in contract. Just as the offeror's
promise puts a legal power in the offeree to enter contract, so does
the principal's representations to third parties put a conditional
power in them to enter contract with the principal upon successful
negotiations with his agent. This unitary character of actual and
apparent authority as merely two types of the same general representative power vested in the agent was early recognized by Mr.
Justice Depue in Law v. Stoke and clearly summarized by Mr.
6 Smith v. Hughes, L.R. 6 Q.B. 597, 607 (1871) (Blackburn, J.); Brauer
v. Shaw, 168 Mass, 198, 46 N.E. 617 (1897); 1 S.WILISTON CONTRACTS
§22 (3rd ed. 1957); 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRA s §§1, 9 (1963); P. ATiYAH, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT

7

4 (1961).

"A principal is bound by the acts of his agent within the authority he
has actually given him, which includes not only the precise act which
he expressly authorized him to do, but also whatever usually belongs
to the doing of it, or is necessary to its performance. Beyond that, he
is liable for the acts of the agent within the appearance of authority
which the principal himself knowingly permits the agent to assume,
or which he holds the agent out to the public as possessing.... In
whichever way the liability of the principal is established, it must
flow from the act of the principal." Law v. Stokes, 32 N.J.L. 249, 251-52
(Sup. Ct. 1867).
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Justice Holmes' articles.8 The principal's words or acts in either
case demonstrate to the third party the principal's objective consent
to be bound in contract by a given class of promises of the agent.
In creating actual authority, the representations of the principal to third party are first made to the agent. The principal
informs his agent, expressly or impliedly, what scope of authority
he is to have. The principal may also inform third parties. If he does
not, his agent may do so, either expressly by correctly relating the
principal's statements or impliedly by offering to contract within
the scope of his actual authority. But, the duty of inquiry is on the
third party. He must find out from the principal what general grant
of actual authority is in the agent. If he fails to do so, he assumes
the risk that the agent's representations about his authority may be
incorrect.9 In such case, the principal will not be bound by the agreement which his agent has made. Hence, it is established law that
the unauthorized representations of an agent or alleged agent to
third parties concerning the existence or scope of his authority have
no legal standing. 10 Bailey and Whites v. House" is a typical example. A former servant of House, who had never had any agency
authority, misrepresented to the third parties that House had sent
him to order goods and take delivery of them. House paid two bills
for such goods before discovering the fraud and later sued to recover
the sums so paid by mistake. In granting recovery, the court held
that the mere mistaken paying of bills was not a holding out of an
ex-servant as an agent and that misrepresentations of an alleged
8

9

"A man is not bound by his servant's contracts unless they are made
on his behalf and by his authority, and that he should be bound then
is plain common-sense. It is true that in determining how far authority
extends, the question is of ostensible authority and not of secret order.
But this merely illustrates the general rule which governs a man's
responsibility for his acts throughout law. If, under the circumstances
known to him, the obvious consequence of the principal's own conduct
in employing the agent is that the public understand him to have given
the agent certain powers, he gives the agent those powers. And he
gives them just as truly when he forbids their exercise as when he
commands it. It seems always to have been recognized that an agent's
ostensible powers were his real powers;..." Holmes, Agency II, 5 H1Av.
L. REV. 1 (1891).
Torrence Nat. Bank v. Enesco Federal Credit Union, 134 Cal. App.2d
316, 285 P.2d 737 (1955); Paine v. Sheridan Trust and Savings Bank,
342 Ill. 342, 174 N.E. 368 (1931); Chapleo v. Brunswick Building
Society, 6 Q.B.D. 696, 705 (1881).

10 Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Bouziden, 307 F.2d 230,

233 (10th Cir. 1962); Atex Manufacturing Co. v. "Lloyds of London",
139 F. Supp. 314, 318 (W.D. Ark. 1955); Burton v. Furniss, 27 L.J. Exch.
(n.s.) 139 (1858); Wright v. Glyn [1902] 1 K.B. 745.
11 31 T.L.R. 583 (K.B. 1915).
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agent can never create authority. The same rule applies when a
principal has employed the agent but the agent mistakenly represents his scope of authority to be greater than that which the
principal conferred on him.' 2
APPARENT AUTHORITY
Apparent or ostensible authority is even more easily seen to be
based on the objective consent of the principal to third parties. It is
that authority which, through not actually delegated to the agent,
the principal intentionally or inadvertently causes third persons to
believe the agent to possess. 13 Apparent authority can exist only if
an agent has been employed and delegated some actual authority.'4
It is founded on appearances of authority created by the principal
and is measured by the reasonable inferences of third parties from
the principal's representations or conduct toward them. Even though
the agent exceeds his actual authority, the principal is bound by his
agent's contracts if they are within the appearance of authority
created by the principal.' 5 In the most common cases, a principal
states to third parties that his agent has a certain general grant of
authority to buy or sell specific products or services without informing them of special limitations on this authority. The functioning of
commerce requires that third parties, unless informed otherwise,
may contract with the expectation that the agent has that authority
which similar agents usually have in the principal's line of business.
The courts will enforce this reasonable expectation. The legal
reasoning is analogous to the case of the offeror's unilateral minor
mistake in contract, where he is bound without his subjective conGumpert v. Bon Ami Company, 251 F.2d 735, 739 (2d Cir. 1958);
Brownell v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 121 F.2d 239, 244 (1st Cir.
1941); Mussey v. Beecher, 57 Mass. 511 (1849); Attorney-General for
Ceylon v. Silva [1953] A.C. 461, 479; Jacobs v. Morris [1902] 1 Ch.
816, 820.
13 "Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal relations of another
person by transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the
other, arising from and in accordance with the other's manifestations
to such third persons." 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §8 (1957).
See Rubenstein, Apparent Authority: An Examination of A Legal
Problem, 44 A.B.A.J. 849 (1958).
14 Reifsnyder v. Dougherty, 301 Pa. 328, 335, 152 A. 98, 101 (1930). Where
no agent has been employed, there can be no authority. Misrepresentations by a person who is not a principal to third parties that he has
employed an agent and delegated authority can only result in agency
liability by estoppel, but not agency. Hoddeson v. Koos Bros., 47 N.J.
Super. 224, 135 A.2d 702 (1957); Barrett v. Deere, M. & M. 200, 173
Eng. Rep. 1131 (1828).
15 Beaufort v. Neeld, 12 C. &. F. 248, 8 Eng. Rep. 1399 (1845); Smith v.
McGuire, 3 H. &N. 554, 561-62, 157 Eng. Rep. 589, 592-93 (1858).
12
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sent. It is the principal's expressions to third parties creating the
appearance of agent's authority which allows him to be bound in
contract with them even though he has not consented to his agent.
The objective actions of the principal upon which apparent
authority are based need not be express representations but can
instead be a course of dealing between principal and third party.
When a principal actually authorizes his agent to make purchases on
credit and the principal pays the bills to a third party for a number
of such purchases, his conduct creates an apparent authority in
the agent to continue to buy on credit. If the agent makes subsequent unauthorized purchases of the same type and absconds with
the goods, the principal is liable. 16 A similar apparent authority is
created when a principal impliedly ratifies a series of unauthorized
contracts of his agent by performing them. The principal's
acquiescence in the agent's contracts, without notice to third parties
that there have been excesses of authority, impresses them with the
appearance of a larger authority than was actually conferred. 1 7 In
another group of cases, apparent authority is created by a principal
who has had no prior contact with third parties by authorizing his
agent to represent the general scope of his authority to them but
not to relate secret instructions, such as price restrictions, which
would impede the agent's bargaining power.' 8 If the agent exceeds
his secret limitations but makes contracts which are usually within
the authority of similar agents, the principal is liable. A third party
who does not confirm an agent's representations of authority with
the principal of course assumes the risk that they may be incorrect
or exaggerated; but if they are the same unqualified general statements which the principal himself would make, the third party is
protected when he presumes the usual apparent authority.
It is clear for all cases of disclosed principals that the apparent
authority of the agent, while conforming to the contract requirement
of consent, still describes a very broad category of liability. By
including all the usual activities of agents in the given line of business and all other usual business practices developed between particular principals and third parties, it explains a rational basis for
liability founded on reasonable expectations in third parties which
are induced by principals. Distinct additional classes such as "usual
16 Todd v. Robinson, 1 Ry. & M. 217, 171 Eng. Rep. 999 (1825); Gilman v.
Robinson, 1 Ry. & M. 226, 171 Eng. Rep. 1003 (1825)
17 Feely Lbr. Co. v. Bookstaver-Burns Lbr. Co., 181 Wash. 503, 43 P.2d

953 (1935); Ramelson v. North West Hide & Fur Co., 15 D.L.R. 905
(Alta. 1914).

18

Butler v. Maples, 76 U.S. 766 (1869). See De Tchihatchef v. The Salerni
Coupling, Ltd. [1932] 1 ch. 330.
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authority" or "scope of agency" are not useful innovations if an
objective theory of contract is to prevail. Their only purpose can
be to create absolute liability in contract without consent of the
principal.
CoNTRAcT BASIs OF APPARENT AUTHOR

The objective theory of agency gives a decisive answer to the
sixty-year old controversy concerning whether apparent authority
is a true authority or creates a liability of the principal based on
estoppel. 19 If apparent authority is a class of authority, it is like
actual authority, a power in the agent to make binding contract
between the principal and the third party. Under this view, both
parties are bound in contract and the principal does not have to
prove ratification to hold the third party. Liability exists whether
the contract is bilateral or unilateral and whether the third party has
changed his position in reliance or the promises are still executory.
On the other hand, if apparent authority is only an estoppel, there
is no contract and only the principal can be held liable; liability
must be based on the principal's misrepresentations of his agent's
authority and change in position in reliance thereon by the third
party. It is thus clear that contract and estoppel are inconsistent
concepts so that they cannot be combined as a basis for apparent
authority.20

In most decided cases, it makes no difference whether the rationale of the court for apparent authority is a true authority or
estoppel since all the elements of contract and of estoppel are
present. 21 But it is the unusual, tough case that can either set a
reasoned, equitable precedent or else deny recovery on the basis of
legal technicalities which are contrary to the usual reliances of the
business community. For this reason, it is submitted that estoppel
is both an unnecessary and an inappropriate basis for apparent
authority.
19 See Cook, "Agency by Estoppel," 5 COLumVE. L. REv. 36 (1905); Ewart,
"Agency by Estoppel," 5 COLUM. L. REV. 354 (1905); Cook, "Agency by
Estoppel: A Reply, 6 CoLumv. L. R v. 34 (1906). Compare Montrose, The
Basis of the Power of An Agent in Cases of Actual and Apparent
Authority, 16 CAN. BAR REv. 757 (1938) with F. TFANY, AGENCY §16
(2d ed. 1924), and R. PowELL, LAw or AGENCY 68-72 (2d ed. 1961).
20 "A man cannot in one breath invoke both the truth and an estoppel;
he must make his choice: ... " Heskell v. Continental Express, Ltd.
[1950] 1 All E.R. 1033, 1044 (Devlin, J). See Canadian and Dominion

Sugar Co., Ltd. v. Canadian National Steamships Ltd. [1947] A.C. 46,
56 (P.C. 1946).
21 See Raynell v. Lewis, 15 M. & W. 517, 527-28 153 Eng. Rep. 954, 958-59
(1846).
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Since estoppel is a rule of evidence, founded on principles of
tort and closely tied to the concept of deceit, it is not itself a cause
of action but a technique of equity to support an incomplete cause
of action.22 The common law does not favor estoppels, and this is
especially true if the same facts will support a substantive cause of
action. A court which pursued a policy of limiting estoppels to their
full technical requirements would in certain cases find that apparent
authority was not proven. An unqualified statement by a principal
to a third party that A is his general sales agent (without revealing
secret limitations thereon) does not meet the technical estoppel
criterion of a false representation. Judge Learned Hand pointed out
that this absence of a misrepresentation or deceit in apparent
authority is especially clear when a corporate principal has delegated broad general authority to an agent which the agent is permitted to represent to third parties and the circumstances make it
unreasonable to expect third parties to seek out a higher corporate
23
official who will verify the exact scope of the agent's authority.
Technical estoppel is also not proved in those cases where only
executory bilateral promises have been exchanged, so that there is
no change in position in reliance. 24 It is only because courts do not
stand on these technicalities that some of them can say that apparent
authority is a type of estoppel.
The contract basis of apparent authority, in contrast to estoppel,
finds direct support in the objective theory of agency, which, as
noted, is directly derived from the objective theory of contract. The
principal's representations or conduct toward third parties create in
the agent a power to contract in excess of his actual authority. This
view of apparent authority requires proof neither of misrepresentation nor of change of position in reliance thereon, and conforms to
the mutuality of obligation requisites of the law of consideration.
It is supported by the majority of American courts and the Restatement 25 but only by a minority of courts in England. 26 However, the
English view may be changing.

25

See Low v. Bouverie [1891] 3 Ch. 82, 105; Lyle-Meller v. Lewis [1956]
1 W.L.R. 29 (C.A.). Compare Jackson, Estoppel as a Sword, 81 LAw Q.
REv. 84 and 223 (1965).
Kidd v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 239 F. 405 (S.D. N.Y. 1917).
Reo Motor Car Co. v. Barnes, 9 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928);
42 HAr.v. L. REV. 570. See Seavey, Agency Powers, 1 OHL. L. REV. 3, 6
(1948); W. SEAVEY, STUDIES IN AGENCY 181, 184 (1949).
Cond6 Nast Press, Inc. v. Cornhill Pub. Co., 255 Mass. 480, 152 N.E. 240

26

(1926); See 1 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF AGENCY §8 (1957), comment d
at 32.
See Meyer & Co., Ltd. v. Sze Hai Tong Banking and Insurance Co., Ltd.

22

23
24

[1913] A.C. 847, 853 (P.C.). Compare Rama Corporation Ld. v. Proved

Tin and General Invsetments Ld. [1952] 2 Q.B. 147, 149-50.
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In Eastern Distributors,Ltd. v. Goldring,27 Justice Devlin dealt

with a unique fact situation in which the basis of apparent authority
became crucial to the decision. P owned a Bedford van and wanted
to buy a Chrysler car from A, an auto dealer. Since P was without
ready money, he acquiesed to a plan of A, whereby P appointed A
as agent to pretend to T hire-purchase (finance) company that A
owned both vehicles and P wished to acquire them. P signed in
blank hire-purchase proposals for both vehicles under which, if
accepted, T would become owner and P the hirer. A completed the
documents and sent them to T, who accepted the proposal for the
van but rejected the one for the car. Since P had directed A that
the two deals were tied together, A had no actual authority to convey the van alone to T. Thus A clearly exceeded his actual authority,
but he falsely notified P that the two deals did not go through. P
told A he considered the proposals cancelled. P, who had retained
possession of the van throughout these negotiations, sold it to X. In
this action, the court allowed T to recover the van from X.
Plaintiff T maintained successfully that he had acquired title
to the van under a contract within the apparent authority of A, the
agent, and that the apparent authority exception to nemo dat quod
non habet was codified under the final "unless clause" of Section
21 (1) of the English Sale of Goods Act.28 Defendant X had argued
that there was merely an estoppel on P and A to deny that which
they had misrepresented in the documents, namely that A owned
the van and therefore had an owner's power to sell it. X had pointed
to the fact that estoppels can not affect the reality of a transaction
or transfer titles, so that under this view the title to the van was
still in P when he transferred it to X.29 X had further argued that
as a good faith purchaser for value from P, he was not bound by
the estoppel against P and could assert his title8 0 In ruling against
these arguments of X, the court upheld the contractual basis of
27

[1957] 2 Q.B. 600.

"Subject to the provisions of this Act, where goods are sold by a
person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them
under authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires
no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of
the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's
authority to sell." Sale of Goods Act, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71, § 21(1) (1893).
29 See Simm v. Anglo-American Telegraph Co., 5 Q.B.D. 188, 206 (C.A.
1879).
30 As to whether persons without knowledge or notice of a misrepresentation can be bound by an estoppel, see Central National Bank of
Richmond v. Rich., 256 N.C. 324, 329, 123 S.E.2d 811, 815 (1962);
28

Richards v. Johnston, 4 H. & N. 660, 157 Eng. Rep. 1000 (1859); G.
BOWEI. ESTOPPEL BY REPRESENTATEON 152-164 (1923); J. EwART, EsTopPLE 196-208 (1900).
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apparent authority. It applied the rule to this situation of limited
actual authority plus apparent ownership without possession, which
it found to fall under the same class as apparent authority.3 1
UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPALS: ESTOPPEL OF
APPARENT OWNERSHIP
The objective theory of agency provides the basis for a primary
rule limiting the contract liability of undisclosed principals: the
agent of an undisclosed principal has no apparent authority. This
follows necessarily from the fact that all representative authority
in an agent is derived from the objective consent of the principal to
the third party, either actual consent through the agent's permitted
acts or apparent consent directly to the third party. An undisclosed
principal, being one whose agent poses as dealing for himself, creates
no direct appearances to the third party. Thus he can never be
charged with appearing to consent that his agent has a certain scope
of authority. This elementary rule was explained by Mr. Justice
Blackburn in Armstrong v. Stokes,32 and it was broadly applied by
Judge Hastie in Senor v. Bangor Mills. 83
In spite of this clear barrier to apparent authority, there are
some situations in which agents in possession of assets of their
undisclosed principalh exceed their actual authority and the courts
still hold the principals liable to the third parties. Professor Seavey
and the Restatement choose to explain this liability as independent
of the conduct or consent of the principal and create a new classification to describe it, inherent agency power.3 4 This radical view that
creates a contract-type of liability without consent of the principal
seems unnecessary to explain the decisions and is so vague it can
cause more analytical problems than it can solve. Although there
is no consent to representative authority in these cases and therefore
31 For a sharp distinction between apparent authority and apparent ownership based on possession of goods or documents of title, see the
following section of this paper.
32 L.R. 7 Q.B. 598, 604 (1872). See Underwood v. Bank of Liverpool and
Martins [1924] 1 K.B. 775, 792 (C.A.) (Scrutton, L.J.); McLaughlin v.
Gentles, 51 D.L.R. 383, 394-95 (Ont. 1919); Miles v. Mcllwraith, L.R.

8 App. Cas. 120 (P.C. 1883); W. BowsTEAD, AGENCY 176 (12th ed. 1959);
R. POWELL, LAW OF AGENCY 60, 176 (2d ed. 1961).

33 211 F.2d 685 (3rd Cir. 1954). See Smith-Perry Electric Co. v. Transport Clearings, 243 F.2d 819, 821 (5th Cir. 1957); Commercial Credit
Corp. v. Stan. Cross Buick, Inc., 343 Mass. 622, 626, 180 N.E.2d 88, 91
(1962); So. Seattle Auto Auction, Inc. v. Ladd, 230 Ore. 350, 362, 370
P.2d 630, 636 (1962); Annot., 95 A.L.R. 1319 (1935); 39 MwN. L. REV.
307 (1955).
34 W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§58, 59 (1964); RESTATE-

MENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 8A, 194-202 (1957).
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no direct contract liability, there are all the elements of estoppel to
deny contract. Since the agents have exceeded all authority to contract for their principals, the rationale for holding the principal must
be his conduct creating an estoppel of apparent ownership in the
agent.3 5 The undisclosed principal directs, permits or enables his
agent in dealing with third parties to pose as the owner of assets
which in fact belong to the principal. If third parties extend credit
or purchase goods in reliance on the apparent ownership of the
agent, when the principal is ultimately responsible for causing such
appearance, the principal is estopped to deny contractual liability.
A word of caution is necessary. The estoppel of apparent ownership in an agent can be asserted only against an undisclosed principal, one who has delegated some actual authority relating to
purchase, sale, pledge or negotiation of contract. A mere bailor has
no such liability. 36 No matter how convincing the appearance or
representations of a bailee in possession that he is the owner of
goods he may not sell his bailor's goods to a third party. The only
exception would be when the bailor has put documentary or other
clear proof of title in the bailee. The policy of the common law on
bailments is that the property interests of the owner take precedence
over any rules aimed at protecting innocent third parties.
APpANT OWNESMP OF A BusmnEss
The leading case concerning apparent ownership of a business
firm and its assets by the agent of an undisclosed principal is Watteau v. Fenwick.37 Defendant, brewer, bought a beer-house from
Humble, and remaining undisclosed to third parties, hired Humble
as its general manager. The license remained in Humble's name and
his name remained over the door. Defendant gave Humble actual
authority to buy only ales and mineral water. In violation of this
limit, Humble bought cigars and Bovril from plantiff on credit.
Mr. Justice Wills held defendant liable, stating that: "... once it is
established that the defendant was the real principal, the ordinary
doctrine of principal and agent applies-that the principal is liable
35

For analysis of the distinctions between apparent authority and apparent ownership, see J. EWART, ESTOPPEL, c. XVII (1900); Mechem,
Ostensible Agency or Ownership, 22 ILL. L. REV. 652 (1928); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §8 (1957).

30 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Stan Cross Buick, Inc., 343 Mass. 622, 626,
180 N.E.2d 88, 91 (1962); Kastner v. Andrews, 49 N.D. 1059, 194 N.W.
824 (1923); Jerome v. Bentley & Co., [1952] 2 All E.R. 114. Note the
special rule for fungible goods in the United States, UNIFomVi COmMERCIAL CODE § 7-205.
37 [1893] 1 Q.B. 346. See Kinahan & Co., Ltd. v. Parry [1910] 2 K.B. 389;
Edmunds v. Bushell, L.R. 1 Q.B. 97 (1865).
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for all the acts of the agent which are within the authority usually
confided to an agent of that character, notwithstanding limitations,
as between the principal and the agent, put upon that authority."
It is submitted that this apparent authority rationale for the
decision is wrong. 8s Since Humble posed as owner and neither he
nor the defendant made any representation of agency authority,
there is no basis for apparent authority. Defendant is liable to the
extent of the value of the assets of the business because he directed
Humble to pose as their owner and is consequently estopped to deny
Humble's ownership of those assets. The action could have been
brought solely against Humble or jointly against Humble and defendant principal and the latter would have been estopped to deny
execution against the assets of the beer-house. This substitute cause
of action against the undisclosed principal alone is based on plaintiff's right of execution against assets in Humble's possession on
which plaintiff reasonably relied in extending credit. No aspects of
agent's authority are involved.
The same misapplication of apparent authority is followed in
the leading United States cases.8 9 In Hubbard v. Tenbrook,40 however, the court comes close to recognizing the distinguishing characteristics of estoppel of apparent ownership. Mr. Justice Mitchell
stated:
A man conducting an apparently prosperous and profitable
business obtains credit thereby, and his creditors have a right to
suppose that his profits go into his assets for their protection in case
of a pinch or an unfavorable turn in the business. To allow an undisclosed principal to absorb the profits, and then, when the pinch
comes, to escape responsibility on the ground of orders to41his agent
not to buy on credit, would be plain fraud on the public.
In the leading Canadian case, McLaughlin v. Gentles,42 the court
clearly recognized that the agent of an undisclosed principal, who in
this case was authorized to carry on a business, could have no
apparent authority. But, failing to understand the estoppel of apparent ownership, the court reversed the judgment for the plaintiff and ordered the action dismissed.
8 See similar critique in J.EWART, ESTOPPEL 246-48 (1900). Compare
7 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1893), with 9 LAW Q. REv. 111 (1893) and 37 SOL. J.
280 (1893).
39 See Herkert-Meisel Truck Co. v. Duncan, 141 Kan. 564, 42 P.2d 587

(1935); Brooks v. Shaw, 197 Mass. 376, 84 N.E. 110 (1908); Rogers v.
Robinson, 104 Mich. 329, 62 N.W. 402 (1895); Hubbard v. Tenbrook,
124 Pa. 291, 16 A. 817 (1889).

40 124 Pa. 291, 16 A. 817 (1889).
41
42

Id. at 296, 16 A. at 817.
51 D.L.R. 383 (Ont. 1919).
(1896).

See Becherer v. Asher, 23 Ont. App. 202
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APPARENT OwNERsHIP OF SEcuR

Es-INDIcIA OF TITLE

These cases concern securities whose owner is registered with
the issuing company; they are not negotiable instruments. 43 If an
owner of such securities causes or permits his agent to assume the
indicia of title to the securities, the principal will be bound by the
agent's sale or pledge as owner. The leading English case is Rimmer
v. Webster. 44 Plaintiff transfered the title to mortgage bonds to a
broker for purpose of sale, and the broker registered the transfer to
himself with the issuer. He then used the bonds to borrow £ 1000
from the defendant and obsconded. In denying the plaintiff recovery
Mr. Justice Farwell said:
If the owner of property clothes a third person with the apparent ownership and right of disposition thereof, not merely by
transferring it to him, but also by acknowledging that the transferee has paid him the consideration for it, he is estopped from
asserting his title as against a person to whom such third party
has disposed of the property, and who took it in good faith and for
value.45

The true owner, by representing the broker as owner through
indicia of title is estopped to deny the power of the broker to put
full title to the securities in a good faith purchaser. Thus, the estoppel of apparent ownership in an agent of an undisclosed principal,
giving an owner's unlimited power of sale or pledge, probably gives
the agent greater power than does the apparent authority of most
agents of disclosed principals.
In Fry v. Smelie4 6 Justice Farwell reiterated this rule relating
to agents with indicia of title, although the case concerned common
stock registered to the principals plus a blank transfer of the shares
signed by them. From the opinions of the other justices, it can be
argued that the agent with only a blank transfer of shares registered
to another does not have indicia of title but merely a broad apparent
authority from a disclosed principal. 47 On either basis of decision,
the third party from whom the agent borrowed less than had been
stipulated by the principal was entitled to retain the shares until
repayment of his loan.
43
44

As to bonds which are negotiable instruments, see London Joint Stock
Bank v. Simmons [1892] A.C. 201.
[1902] 2 Ch. 163. See Marshall v. Nat. Prov. Bank, 61 L.J.Ch. 465

[1892]; Bentinck v. London Joint Stock Bank [1893] 2 Ch. 120.
45 [1902] 2 Ch. 163, 173.
46 [1912] 3 M.B. 282 (C.A.).
47

See Brocklesby v. Temperance Permanent Building Society [1895]
A.C. 173.
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The leading American case of the estoppel of apparent ownership of securities is McNeil v. Tenth National Bank.48 The owner of
stock, in order to secure a loan from his brokers, endorsed the certificate in blank and gave a power of attorney to transfer the shares.
The brokers, without authority, pledged the shares to defendant to
secure a larger loan than made to defendants. In upholding defendant's security interest in the shares, Mr. Justice Rapallo ruled:
It must be conceded, that as a general rule, applicable to property other than negotiable securities, the vendor or pledgor can
convey no greater right or title than he has. But this is a truism,
predicable of a simple transfer from one party to another where
no other element intervenes. It does not interfere with the well-

established principle, that where the true owner holds out another,
or allows him to appear, as the owner of, or having full power of
disposition over the property, and innocent third parties are thus
led into dealing with such apparent owner, they will be protected.
Their rights in such cases do not depend upon the actual title or
authority of the party with whom they deal directly, but are derived
from the act of the real owner, which precludes him from disputing,
as against them, the existence of the title or the power which,
through negligence or mistaken confidence he caused or allowed to
appear to be vested in the party making the conveyance. 49
As to the documents enabling the disposition by the broker, the
court said:
There can be no occasion for the delivery of such documents,
unless it is intended that they shall be used, either at the pleasure
of the depository, or under contingencies to arise.50
Hence, the requirement of estoppel of apparent ownership that there
be some actual authority in the party making the disposition has
been met.
APPARENT OWINRSMP OF GOODS

By far the largest number of cases of estoppel of apparent ownership concern goods. Before the passage of the Factors' Acts, cases
concerning agents in possession of goods were especially troublesome. In many trades, people who were factors were also merchants
who bought and sold for themselves the same types of goods. Third
parties, in contrast to their agent expectations about brokers, generally presumed merchants who dealt in their own names to be
48

46 N.Y. 325 (1871). See Gamble v. Cornell Oil Co., 260 F.2d 860 (10th
Cir. 1958); Powers v. Pacific Diesel Engine Co., 206 Cal. 334, 274 P. 512
(1929); Jerome v. Eastern Finance Corp., 317 Mass. 364, 58 N.E.2d 122
(1944); People's Trust Co. v. Smith, 215 N.Y. 488, 109 N.E. 561 (1915);

Annot., 73 A.L.R. 1405 (1931).
49

46 N.Y. 325, 329 (1871).

50 Id. at 330.
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the true owners. Nevertheless, the basic common-law rule on unauthorized dispositions by factors was nemo dat quod non habet.
The mere possession by a factor of his principal's goods or documents of title did not enable him to make an effective sale or pledge
to third parties.
The one exception to this general protection of principals was
when the factor not only had possession of the goods and apparent
ownership but also had some actual authority to deal with the
goods. In such case, the courts protected the good faith purchaser
from the factor. The classic case is Pickeringv. Busk. 51 The plaintiff
employed a factor, Swallow, to purchase two parcels of hemp for
him. With plaintiff's consent, the hemp, which was in the possession
of a wharfinger, was transferred to Swallow's name. Swallow, without authority, sold the hemp to a third party who became bankrupt.
Plaintiff sued the defendant, assignee of the bankrupt, in trover.
Lord Ellenborough held for the defendant on the basis of the appearance of ownership in Swallow created by plaintiff. His opinion
in denying a motion for new trial creates confusion because he talks
of apparent authority. The appearance of ownership in a factor,
52
however, is inconsistent with an appearance of agency authority.
And the agent of an undisclosed principal, by definition, never appears to be an agent. It is clear that the appearance in Swallow was
one of ownership, as is shown by Lord Ellenborough's final comment:
The sale was made by a person who had the indicia of property:
the hemp could only have been transferred into his name for the
purpose of sale; and the party who has so transferred it cannot now

rescind the contract. If the plantiff had intended to retain the
dominion over the hemp, he should
have placed it in the whar53
finger's books in his own name.

75 4 was a similar case, in which the plaintiff
Dyer v. Pearson
principals allowed their agent, Smith, to purchase and warehouse
in his own name ten bags of wool. Without authority, Smith sold
the wool, and plaintiffs sued the buyer in trover. Chief Justice
Abbot instructed the jury solely on the issue of whether the thirdparty-buyer bought under circumstances which ought to have excited his suspicion and to have induced him to distrust the authority
of the person selling. After a verdict for plaintiff, the Chief Justice
granted a new trial and stated:

51 15 East 38, 104 Eng. Rep. 758 (1812).
52

53

54

See Whitehead v. Tuckett, 15 East 400, 104 Eng. Rep. 896 (1812),
another undisclosed principal case where apparent ownership and
apparent authority are confused.
Pickering v. Busk, 15 East 38, 44, 104 Eng. Rep. 758, 761 (1812).
3 B. & C. 38, 107 Eng. Rep. 648 (1824).
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... I should have left it to the jury to say, whether the plaintiffs
had by their own conduct enabled Smith to hold himself forth to the
world as having not the possession only, but the property; for if the
real owner of goods suffer another to have possession of his property, then perhaps a sale by such a person would bind the true
owner.

This general rule was followed in the United States. 55 In Calais
Steamboat Co. v. Van Pelt's Administrator,56 for example an owner
in California employed an agent in New York to contract for and
supervise the building of a ship. The owner specifically directed the
agent to himself pose as owner and thereby conceal the existence
and identity of the true owner. After completion, the agent, without
authority, sold the ship to an innocent third party. The court held
that since the purchase was from an agent who was apparent owner,
possessed of all the indicia of property, the third party purchaser
could not be divested of the title to the ship.
The estoppel of apparent ownership in an agent in possession of
goods, as a protection for innocent third parties against the title
claims of principals, proved inadequate for nineteenth century commerce. As many factors began financing their principal's dealings,
it became usual for them to hold the documents of title in their
own names and, with the principals' consent, to repledge them to
banks. Yet, in spite of the appearance of ownership in the factor,
when the factor made an unauthorized pledge, the courts refused to
protect the lenders. The factor's unauthorized pledge of goods
resulted in a successful conversion action by the principal against
the pledgee.57 There were a number of other defects. The rule protected only purchasers from agents of undisclosed principals and
left uncertain the rights of purchasers who knew they were buying
from factors representing unnamed principals. Third parties did not
find it commercially feasible to investigate the apparent authority
of this latter group of known agents. Estoppel also did not protect
the purchaser from an agent of a disclosed but distant principal who
had given this usual factor possession of the particular goods or
55 See Preston v. Witherspoon, 109 Ind. 457, 9 N.E. 585 (1886); Jepson
Mfg. Co. v. Shank, 54 Okl. 667, 154 P. 516 (1916); Richardson v.
Bouthillier, 193 Ore. 354, 238 P.2d 212 (1951); Smith v. Clews, 114 N.Y.
190, 21 N.E. 160 (1889). See citations in P. MEcEiEm, OuTLNEs OF
AGENCY §§ 116-122 (4th ed. 1952). On goods entrusted to an auctioneer,

see Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc., 305 N.Y. 180, 111 N.E.2d 871
(1953); Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1953).

56 67 U.S. (2 Black) 372, 374 (1862).
-7

M'Combie v. Davies, 6 East 538, 102 Eng. Rep. 1393 (1805); M'Combie
v. Davies, 7 East 5, 103 Eng. Rep. 3 (1805); Warner v. Martin, 52 U.S.
(11 How.) 209 (1850). See historical comment in Fuentes v. Montis,
L.R. 3 C.P. 268, 277-78 (1868).
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documents solely as bailee. For example, a warehouseman who re-

ceived goods as bailee solely for storage could not be presumed by
innocent third parties to be the owner even though he was regularly
also a merchant for the same class of goods.58 And where goods
were delivered to an agent who was also a merchant for similar
goods, solely to display and receive offers, but not to sell, the owner
was allowed to recover them from a good faith purchaser from the
agent.59 These inadequacies of the common-law protection for the
reasonable reliances of third parties who dealt with English and
American factors led to the passage of the factors' acts.
FACTORs' ACTS: ENGLAND

Factors' acts were passed in England beginning in 1823 and 1825
and in a number of American states in subsequent years. 60 These
acts were designed to remove the uncertainties of estoppel of apparent ownership and to remedy the courts' failures to protect innocent
pledgees of apparent owners at common-law. The early English
acts, which were a model for the New York and some other American statutes, centered on the concept of agents entrusted with goods
for sale. Judicial limitations on the meaning of "entrusted for sale"
led to major amendments in 1842 and 1877 to expand the protection
afforded third parties.61 Finally, in the Act of 1889, which is still the
English law, "agent entrusted" was dropped in favor of the broader
concept, "mercantile agent in possession."
The Factors' Act of2 1889 begins in §1 (1) with the key difinition
of a mercantile agent: 6
1(1) The expression "mercantile agent" shall mean a mercantile
agent having in the customary course of his business as such agent

authority either to sell goods, or to consign goods for the purpose of
sale, or to buy goods, or to raise money on the security of goods.
For a person to be held a mercantile agent for particular goods,
he must customarily as agent sell, consign for sale, buy or pledge
goods of the same general class. This would seem to limit mercantile
agents to general agents, regularly selling the same goods as agents.
The courts, in protecting the reasonable expectations of good-faith
buyers, have also included one category of special agents. If a
merchant who buys and sells a given class of goods is appointed an
58 Wilkinson v. King, 2 Camp. 335, 170 Eng. Rep. 1175 (1809).

See Cole

v. North Western Bank, L.R. 10 C.P. 354 (1875), holding this rule to
continue under the Factors' Act of 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., C. 39.
M Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305, 42 Am. Rep. 332 (1882); Smith v. Clews,
114 N.Y. 190, 21 N.E. 160 (1889); Biggs v. Evans [1894] 1 Q.B. 88.
0 4 Geo. 4 C. 83 (1823); 6 Geo. 4, C. 94 (1825).
61 5 & 6 Vict., C. 39 (1842); 40 & 41 Vict., C 39 (1877).
62 Factors' Act, 52 & 53 Vict., C. 45 § 1(1) (1889).
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agent for a single transaction in goods of that class, he will be
deemed a mercantile agent. In Lowther v. Harris,63 a shopkeeper
who dealt in art goods was appointed a special agent to sell a
tapestry in a nearby house. He was held to be a mercantile agent
though employed as agent for only one sale and though he was not
a general agent but a merchant.
Section 2 (1) contains the major protection for third parties who
deal with factors in good faith: 64
2(1) Where a mercantile agent is, with the consent of the

owner, in possession of goods or of the documents of title to goods,
any sale, pledge, or other disposition of the goods, made by him
when acting in the ordinary course of business of a mercantile agent,
shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be as valid as if he were
expressly authorized by the owner of the goods to make the same;
provided that the person taking under the disposition acts in good
faith, and has not at the time of the disposition notice that the
person making the disposition has no authority to make the same.
The language, "with the consent of the owner, in possession of
goods or documents of title to goods" for the first time gave protection to innocent third-party purchasers even if the factor was given
the goods only to receive offers and without authority to sell. In
Turner v. Sampson,6 5 an owner gave a picture to an art dealer and
asked him to report any offers he might receive for it, but he gave
the dealer no authority to sell the picture. Nevertheless, the dealer
sold the picture and disappeared with the proceeds. In the owner's
action to recover the picture, the court gave judgment for the
good-faith buyer. After reviewing the fact that the prior statute
depended on the relation of the principal to agent in the phrase
"entrusted for sale," the court held that the 1889 amendment was
66
designed to include this case.
63

64
65

66

[19273 1 K.B. 393. See Weiner v. Harris [1910] 1 K.B. 285 (C.A.).
Compare Heyman v. Flewker, 13 C.B.N.S. 519 (1863), illustrating a
special agent under the former statute who would not meet the criteria
for mercantile agent under the 1889 Act.
Factors' Act 52 & 53 Vict., C. 45 §2(1) (1889).
27 T.L.R. 200 (K.B. 1911). For opposite rule under earlier statute see
Brown & Co. v. Bedford Pantechnicon Co., Ltd., 5 T.L.R. 449 (C.A.
1889).
"That state of things was substantially altered by the Act of 1889. The
question now depended to a considerable extent upon what the business
carried on by the factor was, and to bring the case within the act it
must be shown that the goods were entrusted to the factor in that
business. Therefore, at the present time if a person carried on a business in which it was in the ordinary course for persons who carried on
that business to have authority to sell, and if someone entrusted goods
to such a person, he was bound by his acts." Turner v. Sampson, 27
T.L.R. 200, 202 (K.B. 1911).
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Not only does Section 2 (1) protect the buyer taking from a
mercantile agent who was only to receive offers, it also in some circumstances protects the buyer from a mercantile agent who is
merely a bailee for particular goods of the same class as he sells.
In Moody v. Pal Mal Deposit and ForwardingCo.,67 a French company sent certain pictures to their London sales agents, some for sale
and others (6tats prints) solely for exhibition. The agents pledged
all the pictures to defendant who took them in good faith. In upholding the security interest of the defendant, this court also contrasted the more limited law before 1889.68 The generality of this
decision may be debatable. A dictum of Lord Denning indicates
that the factor's possession must relate to sale, getting offers or
display with appearance of being for sale. 69 Furthermore, the courts
have made a sharp distinction under Section 8 of the Factors' Act
between sellers and bailees and have not protected good faith
purchasers from sellers in possession of goods who have become
bailees7
The consent to possession under the Factors' Act is consent in
fact. Even if it is induced by fraud so that on the criminal side there
is false pretenses, or even larceny by trick, the consent to possession is sufficient for the agent to pass a valid title to a good-faith
buyer or pledgee7 1 For the purposes of the Act the consent of the2
owner is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
And where an agent has been given goods or documents with consent of the owner, who then cancels the agent's authority without
notice to third parties, a subsequent sale or pledge by the agent is
still effective.73
67 33 T.L.R. 306 (K.B. 1917).
68 "Under the old law clearly the Factors' Acts did not apply. The 6tats
But the words
prints were never sent for sale but for exhibition....
"entrusted for sale" were replaced by the words "in the possession of
the agent" in the new Act. The object was to make the Act apply to
such goods-all goods which were in the custody of the agent, whether
for sale or not." Moody v. Pall Mall Deposit and Forwarding Co., 33
T.L.R. 306, 307 (K.B. 1917).
69 Pearson v. Rose & Young Ltd. [1951] 1 K.B. 275, 288.
70 See Staffs Motor Guarantee, Ltd. v. British Wagon Co., Ltd. [1934]
2 K.B. 305. ContrastUnion Transport Finance, Ltd. v. Ballardie [1937]
1 K.B. 510.
71 Pearson v. Rose & Young, Ltd. [1951] 1 K.B. 275, 288 (C.A. 1950);
Folkes v. King [1923] 1 K.B. 282, 291-3, 296-7 (1922).
72 Factors' Act, 52 & 53 Vict., C. 45 § 2(4) (1889).
73 Factors' Act, 52 & 53 Vict., C. § 2(2) (1889).
See Moody v. Pall Mall
Deposit and Forwarding Co., 33 T.L.R. 306 (K.B. 1917). §2(2) overruled the earlier decision of Fuentes v. Montis, L.R. 3 C.P. 268, L.R. 4
C.P. 93 (1868).
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Possession is defined in Section 1 (2) as follows:'

4

1(2) A person shall be deemed to be in possession of goods or
of the documents of title to goods, where the goods or documents
are in his actual custody or are held by any other person subject to
his control or for him or on his behalf.
This statutory requirement is illustrated in Lowther v. Harris.5 An
owner stored his tapestries and furniture in a house near the shop
of Prior, whom he appointed agent for sale on the condition that
every potential buyer and price had to be first approved by the
owner. The agent, Prior, was allowed to live in the house and bring
people there to view the goods. Yet the court held that the goods
were still in possession of the owner until Prior was permitted to
remove them for delivery.
The requirement that the factor must be "acting in the ordinary
course of business of a mercantile agent" is explained in Oppenheimer v. Attenborough & Son.76 In this case, diamond dealers gave
possession of some diamonds to a diamond broker who fraudulently
misrepresented that he would show them to two firms he thought
might buy them. The broker pawned the diamonds. It was proved
a custom of the trade that such agents were not usually given
authority to pledge diamonds. Nevertheless, the court held that
the pledgee obtained a valid security interest under the Factors'
Act, since the factor executed the pledge in the ordinary way such
transactions were executed.77 In his opinion, Justice Buckley noted
another fact, which has been effective in England since the 1825
Factors' Act.7 8 that whether the third party believed the agent to
be the owner of the goods or an agent is not material for the purposes of the Act. In extending the protection of third parties, the
74

75

Factors' Act, 52 & 53 Vict., C. 45 § 1(2) (1889).
[1927] 1 K.B. 393 (1926). For the same rule under the former statute,
see Brown v. Bedforn Pantechnicon Co., Ltd., 5 T.L.R. 449 (C.A. 1889).

76

[1908] 1 K.B. 221 (C.A. 1907).

77

"In my opinion the words 'acting in the ordinary course of business of
a mercantile agent' mean that the person must act in the transaction
as a mercantile agent would act if he were carrying out a transaction
which he was authorized by his master to carry out." [1908] 1 K.B.
221, 227 (Averstone L.J.).
"I think it means, 'acting in such a way as a mercantile agent
acting in the ordinary course of business of a mercantile agent would
act': that is to say, within business hours, at a proper place of business,
and in other respects in the ordinary way in which a mercantile agent
would act, so that there is nothing to lead the pledgee to suppose that
anything wrong is being done, or to give him notice that the disposition is one which the mercantile agent had no authority to make."

78

(1908) 1 K.B. 221, 230-31 (Buckley, L.J.).
6 Geo. 4, 94, §4 (1825).
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Factors' Acts not only codified the estoppel of apparent ownership
but also relieved third parties of the obligation of investigating the
apparent authority of known mercantile agents in possession of
goods. In a later similar case, it was held that the pledge of a
necklace at 15 per cent interest, which was contested as not a commercial rate, would not take the transaction out of the ordinary
course of business 7 9
In Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd. v. Williamson,0 8 Salmon, L.J.
further explained the "ordinary course of business, when he ruled: 81
In cases in which the true principal not only put an agent in
possession of the goods and the indicia of title, but also expressly
authorizes him to sell as principal, the question as to whether the
factor sold in the ordinary course of business can, in my judgment,
be relevant only so far as it throws light upon the bona fides of the
buyer.
Other cases have described the limits of the scope of this clause.
Where a diamond broker in possession of his principal's diamonds
had a friend pledge them for him, the pledge was held not to be in
the ordinary course of business.8 2 Where a piano dealer was appointed agent to sell a piano and instead sent it to an auctioneer
for sale, obtaining an advance thereon, the disposition was held not
to be in the ordinary course of business.8. In Pearson v. Rose &
Young, Ltd.,"- the court held that a factor's sale of a car with its
log book was not in the ordinary course of business because possession of the log book had been obtained by the agent without the
consent of the owner. Since the agent's sale of the log book could
not come under the Factors' Act, the sale of the car alone was held
to be outside the ordinary course of business. Furthermore, under
Section 2 (1) of the Factors' Act, the third party is not protected if
he acts in bad faith or has notice that the factor was without
authority to make the disposition. And under Section 4, a factor
may not effectively pledge his principal's interest in goods to pay
the factor's antecedent debt.
FACTORS' ACTS: UinED STATES
The American states which have passed factors' acts fall in two
groups. New York in 1830 and a few other eastern states have passed
statutes modeled in part on the English Factors' Act of 1825. The
79 Janesich v. Attenborough & Sons, 102 L.T. 605 (K.B. 1910).
80 [19651 1 W.L.R. 404 (C.A. 1964).
81 Id. at 410.
82 De Gorter v. Attenborough & Sons, 21 T.L.R. 19 (K.B. 1904).
88 Waddington v. Neale, 96 L.T. 786 (K.B. 1907).
84 [19511 1 K.B. 275 (C.A. 1950). See Stadium Finance Ltd. v. Robbins
[1962] 2 Q.B. 664 (C.A.).
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New York statute, which was repealed in 1965 under adoption in
New York of the Uniform Commercial Code, applied only to merchandise entrusted to an agent to sell or as security for advances
or to documents of title issued or endorsed to the agent.85 Like the
early English statutes, the protection afforded third parties depended on the agent having possession with consent of the owner
for the purpose of sale or pledge. The law was not designed to
protect the good faith purchaser from a mere bailee of merchandise,
even though the bailee was ordinarily an agent who dealt in that
same kind of goods.
The New York statute did not include Section 4 of the 1825
English Act, so that a third party who took the goods knowing that
he was dealing with an agent was not given statutory protection."6
In Massachusetts, Maryland and Rhode Island, one who took goods
with knowledge that he was dealing with a factor (agent) was
protected so long as he took in good faith and without knowledge
of the factor's lack of authority.87 Like in England, these statutes
85 "Every factor or other agent, intrusted with the possession of any bill

of lading, custom-house permit, or warehouseman's receipt for the
delivery of any merchandise, and every such factor or agent not having
the documentary evidence of title, who shall be intrusted with the
possession of any merchandise for the purpose of sale, or as a security
for any advances to be made or obtained thereon, shall be deemed to
be the true owner thereof, so far as to give validity to any contract
made by such agent with any other person, for the sale or disposition
of the whole or any part of such merchandise and any account receivable or other chose in action created by sale or other disposition of
such merchandise, for any money advanced, or negotiable instrument
or other obligation in writing given by such other person upon the
faith thereof." N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 43 (1) (McKinney 1962)

(repealed upon adoption of the UNnoam

86

87

COMMERCIAL CODE,

1964). See

MAINE REv. STAT., ch. 181 (1954) (repealed by ch. 362 § 33 [1963] Laws
of Maine); MARYLAND ANmOT. CODE, Art. 2 (1957); MAss. ANNOT. LAWS
ch. 104 (1967); PAGE'S Omo REv. CODE ANNOT., § 1311.54 (1954) (repealed by 129 v. S 5 (1962), PAGE'S OHIO REVISED CODE ANNOT. § 1302.44
(1962)); PENN. PuRDoN's ANNOT. STAT., Title 6 §§ 201-202 (1963); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 34-32-15 (1956) (repealed by ch. 147 § 2 [1960] R.I. Acts
and Resolves); TENN. CODE ANNOT. §§ 47-1101 to 47-1104 (1955) (repealed upon adoption of the UNwuouvR COMMERcIAL CODE, ch. 81 [1963]
Public Laws of Tenn.).
Dorrance v. Dean, 106 N.Y. 203, 12 N.E. 433 (1887). But if the third
party deals with an apparent owner, his interest is protected even if
he took the goods from a subagent to whom the agent had no authority
of delegation. Kirsch v. Provident Loan Soc. of N.Y., 189 Misc. 898,
71 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1947).
Associate Discount Corp. v. C. E. Fay Co., 307 Mass. 577, 30 N.E.2d 876
(1940).
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factor will give the pledgee no greater right than the factor had. 88
generally have a proviso that a pledge for an antecedent debt of the
Unlike England, where the agent in New York or Massachusetts
induced the owner to trust him with goods by fraud which amounted
to larceny by trick, there was not consent to the agent's possession
and third parties were not protected. 9 And in Massachusetts, if the
agent has no general authority, but is a special agent entrusted
with goods to sell to specified customers, the Factors' Act does not
apply 0
Possession under the American statutes, like the English one,
requires the agent to have actual custody. So that a loan made to a
factor five days before he received the goods which were to be
pledged did not bring the pledge within the statute.9 1 And when an
owner of an automobile entrusted it to a dealer only for showing
and gave the dealer the registration certificate without endorsement,
the dealer was held not to be an agent entrusted with possession.2
But if the general manager of a used car lot has full authority to
take cars from the lot and sell to other dealers and to receive payment, he is entrusted with possession of the cars on the lot.9 3
Furthermore, customs of a trade can be controlling. A dealer delivering precious stones to another dealer under a memorandum
indicating that they were for inspection only could not prevent the
second dealer from becoming an agent entrusted with possession.
Parol evidence was admitted to show that, in spite of such memoranda, it was generally expected in the trade that dealers receiving
such stones had the option of returning them or selling them as
agents.9 4
The California Factors' Act, 95 which has been adopted in Mon-
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N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW, §43(2) (repealed upon adoption of
UNIFORM COMVIERCIAL CODE, 1964); MASS. ANOT. LAws, ch. 104 §5

(1967).
89 Soltau v. Gerdau, 119 N.Y. 380, 23 N.E. 864 (1890); Sweet & Co. v.
Provident Loan Society, 279 N.Y. 540, 18 N.E.2d 847 (1939); H. A.
Prentice Co. v. Page, 164 Mass. 276, 41 N.E. 279 (1895).
90 Boston Supply Co. v. Rubin, 214 Mass. 217, 101 N.E. 133 (1913).
91 DeBeixedon v. Brown &Seccomb, 188 N.Y.S. 451 (1921).
92 Royle v. Worcester Buick Co., 243 Mass. 143, 137 N.E. 531 (1922)
(applying New York Law).
93 Caulson's of Welleslye, Inc. v. Coombe & McBeath, Inc., 342 Mass. 298,
173 N.E.2d 81 (1961).
94 Nelkin v. Provident Loan Society, 265 N.Y. 393, 193 N.E. 245 (1934).
95 CALIF. CIrI CODE §§2026 to 2030, 2367 to 2369 (West 1954) (enacted in
1872).
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tana9 8 and North Dakota, 97 differs markedly from that of the eastern
states. The controlling section states: 98
A factor has ostensible authority to deal with the property of
his principal as his own, in transactions with persons not having
notice of the actual ownership.
The phrase "ostensible authority" is clearly misused in this
statute. An earlier section of the code defines ostensible authority
as such representative authority in an agent as a principal, intentionally or by want of ordinary care, causes or allows a third person
to believe the agent to possess.9 9 As noted above, a factor can not
both appear to be owner of goods and also not the owner because
he has ostensible authority as agent to dispose of them for the
owner.
The language of the California statute protects only "persons
not having notice of the actual ownership." Unlike the English
statute, it is not designed to give extended protection to those who
know they are dealing with an agent. 00 Of the few recorded cases,
the two most recent ones concern automobile dealers. A used car
dealer was held to be a factor when another dealer delivered cars
to him for sale, so that third-party purchasers and lenders to such
purchasers were protected as against the original dealer in whom
the titles were registered. 1°0 And even where used cars, brought
from another state and not registered in California, were delivered
to a dealer only to display for sale in his usual sales lot but without
actual authority to sell, a good faith purchaser for value from the
dealer received the property interest in the car. 0 2 This rule is
clearly consistent with the New York and English views on sales
by factors. But under the former special California statute for
pledges by factors, jewelry delivered to another under a written
contract solely to exhibit and not to sell would entitle the true
owner to recover it from a pledgee of the apparent owner. 10 3 Unlike
96 MONTANA REV. CODE §§2-401 to 2-407 (1947).
97 NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE §§3-06-01 to 3-06-06 (1959).
98 CALI. CIVIL CODE §2369 (West 1954), Compare §2991, which

until 1965

controlled pledges by factors.
99 Id. §2317.

De Raad v. Nash-De Camp Co., 23 P.2d 68 (Cal. App. 1933).
101 Pacific Finance Corp. v. Foust, 44 Cal.2d 853, 285 P.2d 632 (1955).
100

102

103

Siegel v. Bayless, 113 Cal. App.2d 661, 248 P.2d 968 (1952). For a
similar rule even though the third party knew he was dealing with
an agent, see Carter v. Rowley, 59 Cal. App. 486, 211 P. 267 (1922).
California Jewelry Co. v. Provident Loan Assn., 6 Cal. App.2d 506, 45
P.2d 271 (1935), applying CALIF. CIVI CODE §2991 (West 1954), re-

pealed upon enactment of the UNIoPm COMMERCIAL CODE, 1965. Under
§2991, the factor had to have some actual authority to transfer the
goods before the law would protect a pledgee. See Floyd v. Riskin,
25 Cal. App.2d 297, 77 P.2d 233 (1938).
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the New York case, 104 the court would not permit oral evidence that
it was the custom of the trade for such special agents with such
restricted written authority nevertheless to sell the jewelry.
The Uniform Commercial Code, which has been adopted by a
majority of the United States, contains a "factors' act" in that third
parties who buy goods from an agent in possession who is also a
merchant of the same class of goods receive comprehensive protection. The latter parts of Section 2-403 state the rule: 0 5
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who
deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights
of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary courses of business.
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in
retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of
whether the procurement of the entrusting or the possessor's disposition of the goods have been such as to be larcenous under the
criminal law.
Although the term "factor" is not used in this section nor elsewhere in the Uniform Commercial Code, it is reasonably clear that
the term "merchant" in the above subsection (2) does include some
factors. 0 6 Those agents who deal as merchants in the same kind of
goods as those they are entrusted by a principal would come under
the Code. The comment following Section 2-403 states that the
purpose of this part was to gather from the law relating to buyers
from dealers "a single principle protecting persons who buy in the
ordinary course out of inventory. Consignors have no reason to
complain, nor have lenders who hold a security interest in the inventory, since the very purpose of the goods in inventory is to be
turned into cash by sale." The term, merchant, would seem to
include all commodity factors dealing in the products they usually
inventoried, even though it was known in the trade that they always
dealt as agents and took no title in the merchandise. Thus the
merchant could be a known agent. The section does not, however,
cover a sale by a merchant who did not usually deal in the kind of
goods with which he was entrusted in the particular case. Nor does
this section protect any pledgees of factors. Many of these transactions were covered by the earlier factors' acts, and the repeal of
some of these earlier acts by the states which adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code can be questioned on these grounds.
104 See note 91 and accompanying text.
105 UN=roRuvt Coi nMcAL CODE §2-403.
106 '"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practice or goods involved in the transaction .... Id.
§2-104(1).
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The extent to which this Section will protect buyers from
factors to the detriment of the claims of true owners depends on
the interpretation the courts will give to the statutory definition
of the final phrase of subsection (2), "buyer in the ordinary course
of business.' 07 The language seems as broad as the English Act
though it is structured differently. If construed as broadly as the
English Act, a buyer will be in good faith even though he knows he
is dealing with an agent and makes no inquiry of the principal concerning the scope of the agent's authority. The purpose of factors'
acts is to dispense with this duty of inquiry which was the burden
of the buyer from an agent under common law. A factor's act is
designed to confirm the apparent ownership or apparent authority
in the agent. Under this Code, the buyer would seem to be protected if he buys from a factor who is in the business of selling
goods of that kind and he is without actual knowledge that the
sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest
of a third party.
A counter-argument, limiting the scope of Section 2-403, could
be based on the fact that this is one of the sales sections of the
Uniform Commercial Code and hence there was no legislative intent
to enact a general factors' act. It may be designed only to relieve
buyers from any duty to inquire if the goods in the merchant's
inventory are being sold as agent for another or are subject to a
security interest. But, when the buyer actually knows that particular goods are being sold by the merchant as agent, sales law no
longer predominates, and it could be argued that the common law
of agency would here require the third party to inquire of the
principal about the scope of the agent's authority.
Subsection 3 affirms that this statute is much broader in one
aspect than the earlier factors' acts. Under this code, the power of
the factor is not limited to possession of the goods for purposes of
sale or pledge. The factor may be a bailee of the goods and still

transfer title to third parties so long as he is also a merchant who

deals in goods of that kind.1°8 Entrusting of goods to a merchant
merely for display and without actual authority to sell would still
give him the full power to make a valid sale to an innocent third
party. And a merchant who is also a warehouseman of similar goods
107 "Buyer in the ordinary of business" means a person who in good faith
and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the
ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods
buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling
goods of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker. Id. §1-201(9).
108 The California version seems to exclude a mere bailment with one
who is a merchant from "entrusting" under CALIFORIA COMMERCIAL
CODE §2403 (3).
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could sell goods which have been left with him solely for storage
and the purchaser would gain good title. Furthermore, the previous
American rule 0 9 that goods obtained by a factor through larceny
by trick prevents his effective sale to third parties is overruled by
this statute. Hence, our new code conforms to the interpretation of
the English court of "consent of the owner" under the Factors' Act
of 1889.110
Two other sections of the Uniform Commercial Code must be
noted. A buyer of fungible goods from a warehouseman who is also
a merchant receives special protection under Section 7-205. This
section is designed to protect buyers of grains, metals and other
fungible goods and does not protect pledgees. 111 Section 7-502 of the
U.S. Uniform Commercial Code continues the protection in earlier
laws of a holder to whom a negotiable bill of lading or warehouse
receipt has been duly negotiated. 1 2 An agent who is entrusted with
the possession of goods with a power of sale who obtained a negotiable document of title in his own name would be able to negotiate
the document to a good faith buyer or pledgee even though the
agent exceeded his authority.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In a free-market economy, the voluntary assumption of risk and
market uncertainty is a prime basis for holding a party legally
liable to those who are affected by his activities. This is exemplified
in the law of contract where the objective theory holds a party
bound by his consensual promissory expressions if the promisee has
acted reasonably in relying on them. The objective theory of agency
is merely an extension of the basic concept. A principal's liability
in contract to third parties is measured by his expressions to them
concerning the scope of his agent's authority. Whether the principal's expressions are made through the agent in the form of actual
authority or directly to the third party in the form of apparent
authority, consent of the principal is the fundamental characteristic.
Some courts and commentators have failed to perceive these basic
relations because an agent who exceeds his actual authority is acting
109 See note 89, supra.
110 Folkes v. King [1923] 1 K.B. 282 (C.A. 1922).
111 "A buyer in the ordinary course of business of fungible goods sold and
delivered by a warehouseman who is also in the business of buying
and selling such goods takes free of any claim under a warehouse
receipt even though it has been duly negotiated." Umomv COM
CIAL
CODE §7-205.
112 UNiromv CoamnCvarL CODE §7-502; see UNiFovz SALES ACT §33; U iFORMIWAREHOUSE REcEIPTs ACT §41; Uza'omvR BILLS OF LADING ACT
§32.
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without the express consent of his principal to him. But the consent
which is controlling in agency is the principal's consent to the third
party, the apparent authority which is found in the principal's statements to or conduct toward third parties. The scope of apparent
authority of a particular agent in any given trade can be extremely
broad and even expand over time, since it is governed by the conduct of the principal and the usual authority of agents in that trade.
Some of the most difficult classic agency cases concern undisclosed principals, whose agents, by definition can have no apparent
authority. A number of these cases create confusion by holding the
principal liable for the agents unauthorized contracts and use the
language of apparent authority. In essentially all of these cases the
principal has directed the agent to pose as owner of assets which in
fact belong to the principal. A more rigorous treatment of this type
of case would hold the principal liable only on the basis of estoppel
of apparent ownership. Such estoppel is similar to authority in the
sense that it is based on consent and direction of the principal that
the agent purport to own the assets. In reasonable reliance on this
representation, third parties extend credit and enter contracts.
Underlying the liability of the principal is the clear assumption of
risk by him that his agent may exceed his actual authority in
dealing with the assets as purported owner.
When the agent is in possession of goods or documents of title
to goods of his principal, third parties are protected in dealing with
him in some jurisdictions by factors' acts. For the undisclosed principal cases, these statutes go beyond a mere codification of the
estoppel of apparent ownership, since under them even an executory
contract is sufficient change in position of the third party to hold
the principal liable. The English statute also codifies apparent
authority of the agent in possession of goods or documents of title,
since it applies even though the third party knows he is dealing
with an agent. Factors' acts seem to incorporate the reasonable
expectations of businessmen in an industrialized society. Section
2-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code is also a type of factors' act,
but it is of limited scope. Since this act includes only those factors'
who deal as merchants in goods of the same kind and does not protect pledgees of factors, it would seem appropriate to advocate the
adoption of general factors' acts in all of the American states.

